Adeyinka Makinde trained for the law as a barrister. He lectures in criminal law and public law at a university in London, UK, and has an academic research interest in intelligence & security matters. He is a contributor to a number of websites for which he has written essays and commentaries on international relations, politics and military history. He has served as a programme consultant and provided expert commentary for BBC World Service Radio, China Radio International and the Voice of Russia.
Items mentioned in /relevant to the interview
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Comments disputed by Brzezinksi: an interview with Le Nouvel Observateur, Paris (15-21 January 1998): “Yes. According to the official version of history, CIA aid to the Mujahiddin began during 1980, that is to say, after the Soviet army invaded Afghanistan on December 24, 1979. But the reality, closely guarded until now, is completely otherwise: Indeed, it was July 3, 1979 that President Carter signed the first directive for secret aid to the opponents of the pro-Soviet regime in Kabul. And that very day, I wrote a note to the president in which I explained to him that in my opinion this aid was going to induce a Soviet military intervention.”
Denial by Brzezinksi on The Real News: "No, that's not accurate. I don't know what that's based on. There are two different aspects here that are kind of connected. One: Robert Gates revealed in his memoirs, accurately, that before the Soviets staged the formal invasion of Afghanistan -- but they were already in Afghanistan with Special Forces and so forth -- we increased military (no) we increased financial assistance to the Mujahideen. It was mostly for the acquisition, presumably, of weapons. And then after they came in (when the Soviets came in) I did send the President a memo saying "Yes, their entry into Afghanistan -- at a time of turmoil in Iran, and in the whole Persian Gulf region as a consequence potentially -- we have a chance to give the Soviets their Vietnam." "
Essays by Makinde
German use of the Islamic Option
Britain and the Creation of Saudi Arabia
The United States and the Muslim Brotherhood
FBI Informants and Terror
Coercive Engineered Migration